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The publication of the name of a person suspected of having committed a crime is permissible only after a conviction has entered into legal force or in cases expressly provided for by law. The mere need of the State to inform society about high-profile cases does not in itself constitute an unconditional ground for the disclosure of personal data in a manner that creates the impression of the person’s guilt.
These conclusions were reached by the Supreme Court, sitting as the Joint Chamber of the Civil Cassation Court, in order to ensure uniformity of case law.
In the case under review the claimants (a married couple suspected of involvement in the murder of a journalist) brought an action seeking a declaration that the disseminated information was untrue, the protection of personal non-property rights, and an order requiring the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and certain television and radio companies to perform specific acts. The dispute arose from an urgent briefing held in December 2019 with the participation of senior State officials, during which the claimants’ surnames, first names and photographic images were made public and it was asserted that they had played a direct role as perpetrators of the crime. The claimants sought a declaration that this information was untrue, that it violated the presumption of innocence and their rights to name and image, and an order requiring the defendants to retract and delete the data.
The court of first instance, whose conclusions were upheld by the court of appeal, dismissed the claim. The courts considered that the officials had not asserted the claimants’ guilt but had merely informed the public about the progress of the investigation into a high-profile case on the basis of the investigator’s authorisation.
The Joint Chamber of the Civil Cassation Court of the Supreme Court partially allowed the claimant’s cassation appeal, closing the proceedings in so far as they concerned the claim that the information relating to the assessment of circumstances that form the subject-matter of proof in the criminal proceedings was untrue. Such claims are not amenable to judicial examination in civil proceedings. The reasoning in respect of the remaining claims was also altered.
Pursuant to part 2 of Article 272 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, a natural person has the right to require officials and public servants to take appropriate measures aimed at ensuring the exercise of his or her personal non-property rights; and pursuant to part 3 of Article 273 of the same Code, the activities of natural and legal persons must not infringe personal non-property rights.
The above statutory provisions serve to maintain a balance between the necessity of conducting investigations in criminal proceedings in order to protect the public interest and the prevention of harm to a person’s reputation during such an investigation.
Pursuant to part 1 of Article 294 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, a natural person has the right to a name.
Part 4 of Article 296 of the Civil Code of Ukraine lays down a general rule according to which the use (publication) of the name of a natural person who is detained, suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence is permissible only after a conviction has entered into legal force or in cases expressly provided for by law.
Where a legislative provision contains the concluding formula “and in other cases”, this permits the conclusion that the rule set out in that legal norm cannot be abrogated either by special legislation or by agreement of the parties, but may only be supplemented – by special legislation or by agreement of the parties.
The said provision of Article 296 of the Civil Code of Ukraine contains the phrase “in other cases provided for by law”, which, from the standpoint of legislative technique, is of a referential (blanket) character and in effect indicates that
the list of grounds for the publication (disclosure) of the name of a person who is detained, suspected or accused of having committed a criminal offence, or of a person who has committed an administrative offence, as set out in the Civil Code of Ukraine, is not exhaustive and that the legislature contemplates the possibility of disclosing the name of such a person in cases that are expressly provided for by other laws of Ukraine.
At the same time, legislative technique does not endow this norm with the qualities of free discretion on the part of the law-applying body. It cannot be regarded as an unconditional general authorisation for the disclosure of a natural person’s name on the grounds of informing society or for the purpose of accountability of public authorities. Otherwise the blanket formula would in effect be transformed into a means of circumventing the restriction laid down in Article 296 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, which is incompatible with the requirements of legal certainty and the prohibition of arbitrary interference by the State as constituent elements of the rule of law.
The provisions of the statutes by which the relevant State and law-enforcement bodies and services are guided in their activities define only the general principles of communication policies concerning the activities of the body; they do not establish special rules governing the use (publication) of the personal data of participants in criminal proceedings. Consequently, such provisions cannot be regarded as a legal basis for the publication of the name of a suspected or accused person in breach of the restrictions laid down in Article 296 of the Civil Code of Ukraine.
The foregoing demonstrates that the imposition upon a law-enforcement body of a duty to inform society does not, of itself, confer upon it the right to disclose personal data in a manner capable of creating a public impression of a person’s guilt before a conviction has been delivered in respect of that person.
Consequently, the said legal norm (Article 296 of the Civil Code of Ukraine) is of a guarantee character and is designed to safeguard constitutional values, in particular to prevent the premature “criminal stigmatisation” of a person through the public communications of State authorities.
According to the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights, Article 6 § 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms prohibits not only the premature expression by a court of an opinion as to guilt, but also any statements by other public officials that are capable of creating in the public mind a belief in the guilt of the suspect or of predetermining the court’s assessment of the facts. It was on these grounds that the European Court of Human Rights found violations in the cases of Allenet de Ribemont v. France, Lavents v. Latvia, Butkevičius v. Lithuania, Minelli v. Switzerland, Shagin v. Ukraine, Dovzhenko v. Ukraine.
At the same time, the Joint Chamber of the Civil Cassation Court of the Supreme Court drew attention to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan of 22 April 2010, in which it was emphasised that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention does not prohibit the authorities from informing the public about ongoing criminal investigations, but requires them to do so with the utmost care and circumspection necessary to respect the principle of the presumption of innocence.
In that case the European Court of Human Rights stressed that the presumption of innocence is violated if a statement by an official reflects the view that the person is guilty before his or her guilt has been proved. At the same time, the Court clearly indicated that it was necessary to inform the public about the alleged offence and the proceedings.
Analysing the boundary between the right to information and the presumption of innocence, the Joint Chamber of the Civil Cassation Court of the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory duty of law-enforcement officers to report to the public is not identical to a right of uncontrolled disclosure of personal data. Any information about the progress of high-profile investigations must be provided with the utmost circumspection, using neutral procedural language that does not enable society to form a conviction of the person’s proved guilt before the conclusion of the judicial process.
The Joint Chamber of the Civil Cassation Court of the Supreme Court also drew attention to the criterion of the effectiveness of judicial protection, noting that a purely declaratory claim for the protection of personal non-property rights, namely a claim for recognition of a violation of the right to a name or image, without the assertion of effective remedies is incapable of genuinely restoring the infringed right.
Resolution of the Joint Chamber of the Civil Cassation Court of the Supreme Court of 22 June 2026 in case No. 761/1004/20 (proceedings No. 61-7826ñâî24) – https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/138668659
This and other legal positions of the Supreme Court can be found in the Database of Legal Positions of the Supreme Court - https://lpd.court.gov.ua.
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